Found the error Not allowed to load local resource: file:///etc/passwd while looking at infosec.pub’s communities page. There’s a community called “ignore me” that adds a few image tags trying to steal your passwd file.

You have to be extremely poorly configured for this to work, but the red flags you see should keep you on your toes for the red flags you don’t.

  • himazawa@infosec.pub
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    2 years ago

    Is this, by any chance, originated from the sub called ignore? In that case is probably my bad because is set as the image of the channel. (I was playing with lemmy in the previous version and forgot about it, sorry. It will not work since your browser can’t access local file that easily without breaking the sandbox :))

    Edit: I removed it so you shouldn’t see the alert anymore. What I wasn’t expecting is that apparently every sub is loaded even if you don’t visit it.

    /cc @shellsharks@infosec.pub

    • BlueBockser@programming.dev
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      2 years ago

      But… why? Why even put that URL there? Even if it was most likely harmless for all users, this still looks like an attempt at data exfiltration.

      • himazawa@infosec.pub
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        2 years ago

        Because I wanted to try if others URI schemas were supported instead of http / https. file:// was a valid one. Don’t worry, the day an attempt of data exfil will happen, you will not see it though your console logs.

  • Farthom@lemmy.ca
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    2 years ago

    Holy shit this is kind of unsettling. Though I would expect ALL major browsers to reject reading any local files like this… would this kind of thing actually succeed somewhere/somehow?

    • Rooster@infosec.pubOP
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      2 years ago

      If you ran your browser as root and configured your browser to load local resources on non-local domains maybe. I think you can do that in chrome://flags but you have to explicitly list the domains allowed to do it.

      I’m hoping this is just a bad joke.

        • Greg Clarke@lemmy.ca
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          2 years ago

          Are you sure? What do you get when you run $ cat /etc/passwd in terminal? Just paste the results here 😇

          Edit: to anyone reading this on the future, don’t actually do this, it was a joke

          • fox@vlemmy.net
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            2 years ago

            yup pretty sure

            $ cat /etc/passwd
            fox:hunter2:1000:1000::/home/fox:/usr/bin/zsh
            

            😉

          • delial@lemmy.sdf.org
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            2 years ago

            Since you told me not to. There isn’t a risk on most linux systems; passwords were moved to /etc/shadow a long time ago. It only leaks the names of your users and largely useless info for most attackers:

            root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
            daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
            bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
            sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
            sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
            games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
            man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
            lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
            mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
            news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
            uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
            proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
            www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
            backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
            list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
            irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
            gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/nologin
            nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
            _apt:x:100:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
            systemd-network:x:101:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
            systemd-resolve:x:102:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd:/usr/sbin/nologin
            messagebus:x:999:999:System Message Bus:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
            systemd-timesync:x:998:998:systemd Time Synchronization:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
            systemd-coredump:x:997:997:systemd Core Dumper:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
            delial:x:1000:1000:,,,:/home/delial:/bin/bash
            sshd:x:103:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
            xrdp:x:104:110::/run/xrdp:/usr/sbin/nologin
            dictd:x:105:111:Dictd Server,,,:/var/lib/dictd:/usr/sbin/nologin
            nm-openvpn:x:106:112:NetworkManager OpenVPN,,,:/var/lib/openvpn/chroot:/usr/sbin/nologin
            sssd:x:107:113:SSSD system user,,,:/var/lib/sss:/usr/sbin/nologin
            
            • marvin@lemmy.sdf.org
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              2 years ago

              Well it’s not completely useless. It offers some insights into the system. Which service accounts exists, what usernames are used.

              If an attacker finds a valid username they can then start bruteforcing the password.

              From your account list we can see you have sshd and xrdp. Do they both provide the same kind of bruteforce protection? Are there any recent exploits for either?

      • Farthom@lemmy.ca
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        2 years ago

        Yeah, seems highly unlikely to ever yield any results. Even if you did manage to read a file, you have to get lucky finding a password hash in a rainbow table or the password being shit enough to crack.

        • nzodd@beehaw.org
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          2 years ago

          Also generally the actual password (or rather its hash) is stored in /etc/shadow on most systems from the past 20 odd years.

  • z2k_@lemmy.nz
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    2 years ago

    I wonder if it is a bad actor or someone is trying to pentest Lemmy. If they were a bad actor wouldn’t they be more successful posting in a more popular community than “ignore me”?

  • PenguinCoder@beehaw.org
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    2 years ago

    Nice share, thanks for the information. Definitely need to be careful both as a server operator with Lemmy, and a user of it.

  • laenurd@lemmy.lemist.de
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    2 years ago

    While this is concerning, I wonder what the author(s) of this were thinking would happen. I assume it’s supposed to be an attempt at stealing the server’s passwords, since I at least know of no browser that freely allows access to local files.

    • ollien@beehaw.org
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      2 years ago

      FWIW, /etc/passwd itself contains no passwords (the name exists for historical reasons) but it definitely is a globally accessible file that can give you clues about the target system. Given this, it’s more likely the user is attempting to find out if arbitrary disk reads are possible by using a well known path on many servers.