Linux users who have Secure Boot enabled on their systems knowingly or unknowingly rely on a key from Microsoft that is set to expire in September. After that point, Microsoft will no longer use that key to sign the shim first-stage UEFI bootloader that is used by Linux distributions to boot the kernel with Secure Boot. But the replacement key, which has been available since 2023, may not be installed on many systems; worse yet, it may require the hardware vendor to issue an update for the system firmware, which may or may not happen. It seems that the vast majority of systems will not be lost in the shuffle, but it may require extra work from distributors and users.
If secure boot is off, and you run malware on your pc, it can change the boot process to escalate privileges.
This probably requires root or admin in the first place, but if they can install a malware loader, they can establish persistence so that even if you remove the os-level components, they’ll be reinstalled on reboot.
This is technically correct, but on a desktop system, malware executing in user space is normally already game over. It can exfiltrate and send your passwords or ssh private keys, change browser certificates or browser software, add user systemd sessions or crontab entries and can generally e.g. do everything a banking trojan would like to do.
Yeah, but the malware can just wait for a system upgrade where you sign a new boot image and slip itself in then.
It works for Windows because theoretically only Microsoft would have the signing key and it’s not just sitting on disk somewhere. But then you’re just trusting Microsoft, and also subject to vendor lock-in.