Diamond is kind of a boring gem anyway imo, I’d prefer something with more colour

I think people just kinda like to personify things, it happens all the time even with things that aren’t even close to human

The reason as to why here relative to elsewhere is probably because people here tend to be more into free software and privacy and things like that, and caring about those things tends to have an anti-corporate aspect, because of the way corporations tend to act, and aligns pretty well with wider anticapitalist beliefs

Also the devs and pre-Reddit influx population are anticapitalist so that kind of helps influence the trajectory a bit

I’m quite into linguistics so as far as potential jobs kinda related to that I don’t think I’d mind working in translation.

Unfortunately not sure how great the future for that is with the improvements in machine translation, especially since the only languages I speak are pretty widely spoken and so those for which that’s going to be most developed

I’m reading a few actually: Capital volume 2 by Marx, The Tondrakian Movement by Vrej Nersessian, and Primavera con una esquina rota by Mario Benedetti

Even if you look at monarchs (with relatively good living standards) who died of natural causes, those who make it to their 70s and certainly their 80s are pretty rare. Doesn’t mean the ‘everyone died in their 30s’ thing is true, but I’d say making it to your 50s and maybe 60s would be a more reasonable expectation

Kinda reminds me of this

Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.

The first I can remember was I think when I was 4, and basically I got abducted by a UFO and it turned out that it was the Simpsons that had abducted me.

Needless to say this was a terrifying dream to 4 year old me

Does Singer explore how the limits of one’s knowledge about the impacts of their actions might play into the decisions?

Only very briefly, and not in a way that I think really addresses your specific example:

Admittedly, it is possible that we are in a better position to judge what needs to be done to help a person near to us than one far away, and perhaps also to provide the assistance we judge to be necessary. If this were the case, it would be a reason for helping those near to us first. This may once have been a justification for being more concerned with the poor in one’s town than with famine victims in India. Unfortunately for those who like to keep their moral responsibilities limited, instant communication and swift transportation have changed the situation. From the moral point of view, the development of the world into a “global village” has made an important, though still unrecognized, difference to our moral situation. Expert observers and supervisors, sent out by famine relief organizations or permanently stationed in famine-prone areas, can direct our aid to a refugee in Bengal almost as effectively as we could get it to someone in our own block. There would seem, therefore, to be no possible justification for discriminating on geographical grounds.

If I’m sick or in a crowded space it kinda feels like common sense to me at this point tbh. Especially when sick, like I can’t fathom how I thought it was normal to just be sick and go out without a mask probably getting other people sick, even if it was just a cold.

I didn’t actually watch the video, but I have read the original essay and I thought I’d offer a few thoughts (and criticisms) of it.

An interesting consequence of his strict utilitarianism is that it follows from it that it’s actually immoral to do anything to help issues close to home in pretty much any way if you live in the West, and maybe even in other countries as well, regardless of whether that may be by donating, volunteering, or anything else of the sort.

if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.

Because of wealth disparities between countries, your money will almost always go further somewhere else. If you live in the West, this difference can be extreme, and as a result any money sent there will be able to accomplish far more than it will for people in your own area. Since your donation to help out nearby is a donation not being made elsewhere where it can do more good, it is then to be considered immoral. A similar logic can be applied to volunteering. If when you’re volunteering you are not working to make money which you could donate to much poorer countries, it’s immoral, because your personal work to do good will never be able to equal what your money could do. In fact, your life should essentially be, to the greatest extent that doesn’t reduce the amount you can make by the harm it does to you, you constantly working. He even admits as much:

Given the present conditions in many parts of the world, however, it does follow from my argument that we ought, morally, to be working full time to relieve great suffering of the sort that occurs as a result of famine or other disasters.

He even goes as far as to say the following:

we ought to give until we reach the level of marginal utility —that is, the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependents as I would relieve by my gift. This would mean, of course, that one would reduce oneself to very near the material circumstances of a Bengali refugee.

If this is the case, it has important implications for political action in its many manifestations as well. Should I be campaigning for the government to adopt policies which reduce suffering as much as possible? If implemented their effect could be massively beneficial, but I don’t think this works with the arguments he makes. My individual contribution to a political movement will never be the difference between its success and its failure, so it would seem the moral decision is for me to remain effectively apolitical.

This however strikes me as being in contradiction with this later statements:

I agree, too, that giving privately is not enough, and that we ought to be campaigning actively for entirely new standards for both public and private contributions to famine relief.

I would sympathize with someone who thought that campaigning was more important than giving oneself

Ultimately, I am led to the conclusion that following his arguments, the only moral thing to do is in fact to relentlessly pursue financial gain, as donating the money one earns is far and away the most effective use of one’s time and effort to do moral good. The engineer who could have worked for Lockheed Martin designing weapons for the US military is in fact more moral than the one who turns down the job for one that pays substantially less, since it is practically certain that whoever would take the job otherwise would not donate as generously as they do. Applied to capitalists (the class of people, not the supporters of capitalism), it seems that since giving money is the moral thing to do, and giving more money does more good, making more money is the moral thing to do, as it increases one’s capacity to do good. This seems to be borne out by his statements concerning foreign aid, which indicate that it’s not just about giving what you can in the present moment, but also considering how your actions impact your future ability to continue to do so:

Yet looking at the matter purely from the point of view of overseas aid, there must be a limit to the extent to which we should deliberately slow down our economy; for it might be the case that if we gave away, say, 40 percent of our Gross National Product, we would slow down the economy so much that in absolute terms we would be giving less than if we gave 25 percent of the much larger GNP that we would have if we limited our contribution to this smaller percentage.

I find that this ends up being quite problematic, because the ability to grow one’s own wealth is functionally unlimited. It might seem that that’s not a problem if you’re giving away all your wealth, but for it to grow so you can give more, that can’t be the case, because you need to be reinvesting it. As a result you end up with this contradiction, where your are morally obligated to increase your wealth so you can do more good, but at the same time this obligation prevents you from actually putting that wealth into doing good. You could say that the not doing good with the money means that it’s no longer moral so you have to give at some point, but the problem with that is that it’s impossible to define that point. It still remains that at any given point in time the moral thing to do is to reinvest it so that if you give it next time, more will be given. Ironically, this endless pursuit of ever greater wealth is the very same thing that creates so much suffering in the world, even if its justification is usually different, so this argumentation seems to just end up reinforcing the same ills that it hopes to address.

I do like his conclusion though, directed towards other philosophers, reminiscent of a Marx quote that I’ve always been quite fond of: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.”

I do genuinely enjoy cycling yeah, at least if it’s outside. In general though I hate working out (and don’t do it nearly enough as a result), but I do actually like the feeling afterwards

Idk how much it’s really messing with the computers, but once during a standardised maths exam where everything was supposed to be locked down oh all the computers (including preventing you from accessing the calculator), I figured out how to get around that and open the calculator (can’t remember exactly how), but anyway I was good at maths so I didn’t need it and I thought it would be funny to point it out to the teacher watching over the exam and I got accused of cheating so that was fun

Didn’t know people thought this. Anyway they’re definitely missing out because wild strawberries are great, much better than other strawberries imo

Qtile is great, finally put an end to my WM hopping (at least until I try out Wayland maybe)

YSK: Nonbinary watermelons are even better than male and female watermelons, but they’re pretty rare so they tend to command a high price

Not a single piece, but I was pleasantly surprised by Ethel Cain’s album Preacher’s Daughter. Definitely not the sort of music I usually listen to, so I didn’t expect that much despite what I’d heard about it, but I actually ended up quite liking a fair few of the songs (although definitely not all of them).

Check the instance this account is on

Data was seized though

(except my laptop. I just can’t).

That’s kinda funny because that’s probably their product category that I find the most compelling. Watches and earbuds I don’t care about, phones can really go either way, but since they switched to the M chips the power and efficiency are just so good the Windows laptop just look a lot worse in comparison to me.